SEVEN
publicações acadêmicas

CONTRIBUTIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE PSYCHOKINETIC, PSYCHOMOTOR AND DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES TO PHYSICAL EDUCATION

CONTRIBUIÇÕES DA FENOMENOLOGIA PARA AS ABORDAGENS: PSICOCINÉTICA, PSICOMOTORA E DESENVOLVIMENTISTA DA EDUCAÇÃO FÍSICA

CONTRIBUCIONES DE LA FENOMENOLOGÍA A LOS ENFOQUES PSICOCINÉTICOS, PSICOMOTORES Y DE DESARROLLO DE LA EDUCACIÓN FÍSICA

https://doi.org/10.56238/sevened2025.030-051

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents excerpts from the text produced for the Physical Education Methodologies course offered by the Institute of Biosciences at UNESP, Rio Claro Campus, Department of Pedagogy. The aim is to compare the psychological theories: developmental-constructivist, psychogenetic, and behaviorist, which underpin the psychokinetic, psychomotor, and developmental approaches to Physical Education, with the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, specifically in his work "Phenomenology of Perception."

Keywords: Phenomenology. Learning. Movements.

RESUMO

Trata-se de apresentar os fragmentos do texto produzido para a disciplina Metodologias da Educação Física oferecido pelo instituto de biociências da UNESP. Campus de Rio Claro Departamento de Pedagogia. E que tem como meta comparar as teorias psicológicas: desenvolvimentista – construtivista, psicogenética e comportamentalista que sustentam as abordagens, psicocinética, psicomotora e desenvolvimentista da Educação Física com a filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, especificamente em sua obra Fenomenologia da Percepção.

Palavras-chave: Fenomenologia. Apreender. Movimentos.

RESUMEN

Este artículo presenta extractos del texto elaborado para el curso de Metodologías de la Educación Física, impartido por el Instituto de Biociencias de la UNESP, Campus Rio Claro, Departamento de Pedagogía. El objetivo es comparar las teorías psicológicas (constructivista evolutiva, psicogenética y conductista), que sustentan los enfoques psicocinético, psicomotor y evolutivo de la Educación Física, con la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty, específicamente en su obra "Fenomenología de la Percepción".

Palabras clave: Fenomenología. Aprendizaje. Movimientos.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Initially, I express my satisfaction in carrying out this review of the learning approaches of Physical Education. I know the responsibility and dimension that it is to make this reading of the approaches to Physical Education treated here in the face of the philosophy of the phenomenology of perception. This idea arose as a need to resume my work at the university. After two years of premium leave. I decided not to retire and was assigned to take over the discipline of Physical Education Methodologies for the Pedagogy course. This possibility of dealing with this theoretical and philosophical review is the result of the trajectory of studies on phenomenology with Professor Joel Martins, which I could not present before because he was involved with other subjects, Capoeira, Animal Law. I believe that this is the time to be able to offer my contribution to Physical Education. In this article, albeit in a quick and concise way. It is also important to point out that our tradition of teaching movements has always been guided by theories and approaches that limit the understanding of what it is to apprehend a movement. Such a tradition of elevating Physical Education to a body of scientific knowledge, places a delay so that we, added to the inexistence of a philosophical practice, remain so long without deepening this foundation and essential principle of Physical Education, the apprehension of a movement, revealing that this dimension of this understanding was and is since its epistemology doomed to deny philosophical thinking and shows why we resist so much, either because of difficulty of access or because of not wanting to abandon existing philosophies, to seek what Merleau-Ponty reveals to us about perception.

2 ON LEARNING APPROACHES: PSYCHOKINETICS, MOTOR AND DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

The Psychokinetic approach in Physical Education, Le Bouch (1987) has its tradition guaranteed in Physical Education. In Brazil it has become another practice of Physical Education in schools, as it is essentially learning basic human movements, walking, running, jumping, throwing, grabbing, ball skills. However, it seems to have fallen into oblivion, remaining as a legacy that Physical Education preserves in its activity of educating through movement. His scientific production was surpassed by the psychomotor approach. Le Bouch's great contribution is to give a rational status to Physical Education, raising it to the same level of importance as the subjects of: Portuguese (reading and writing), mathematics, thus discovering the psychologist and physical educator that movement can interfere in rational learning. However, as for the movement itself, he added little. The question: How

does the child already know how to move, before any learning? Or, as the child can speak even before going to school, learning letters and words, there is a hiatus that the Psychologies focused on Physical Education have not been able to understand, they have failed to describe the subjectivity of this learning.

The psychomotor approach of the North American tradition has had a great influence on all Physical Education teachers, especially in the field of science and academic production. Undoubtedly, he was and still is, today, an exponent in the production of research in this approach, following the model of behavioral, developmental, and psychogenetic psychologies. The North American model of motor learning of movements was established in Brazil and in the world.

Although it is possible to place differences in the Psychokinetic and Psychomotor approaches, such as the proposal and performance of the two approaches. Psychokinetics, which is an adaptation of Piaget's psychology, linked more to education, concerned with education through movement, in which movement becomes the basis for the learning of other knowledge, differs radically from the Psychomotor approach, Schmidt (1993), which takes to the extreme the learning of movement as motor performance, the best way to perform, more efficiency in movement, the movement technique, in which definitions and concepts are instituted about what movements are, skills and concerned with reaching the technique, the best way to execute the movement, the most efficient way to execute the movement. It is worth stating here that the Psychokinetic, Psychomotor and Developmental approaches have their theoretical bases in behaviorism and in the psychogenetic psychology of Jean Piaget.

Le Bouch (1987) focuses on the formation of body image as a development that goes from birth to 6 years old. This theoretical hypothesis is that this body image is then developed by the psychomotor function, an association between the psychic translated as the cognitive and the movement, thus becoming a generalized principle.

What Le Bouch op.cit., in this preparatory cycle, proposes is a form of Physical Education, so called, education through movement. However, its practical proposal is a movement education, and that from this component the child could overcome his difficulties in reading, writing and mathematics, that is, what is proposed in a Psychokinetic Physical Education is a movement education, in which the child has a motor development process from 6 to 12 years of age based on the theoretical notion of body image, of the imaginary body the image of the operative body. He describes development in the same way as Piaget's associative intellectualist psychology, in which there are stages of development: the first

sensory-motor psychomotor stage up to the age of 7 is in the same preoperative situation, for Piaget, where formal operative thinking is not yet defined. For Le Bouch, body image has not yet been formed, so the child does not have the ability to move. It should be pointed out here that Le Bouch recognizes that his position is only theoretical.

Le Bouch op. cit.

> We remember that body image is not a function, but a useful concept on the theoretical level, as it serves as a guide to better understand motor development through the various stages. (p.15)

This is the main problem of intellectualist associationist psychologies, they are always concepts, ideas. Let us think, then, of the term body image and look for the perception of one's own body, or the self-body or even the lived body, an expression of phenomenology, but which was also used by Le Bouch op. Cit.

> In fact, one cannot speak of the image of the body until the EGO is unified, individualized, and until the sense of reality is acquired, that is, at the end of the stage of the lived body. (p.16)

However, I find the expression lived body in Le Bouch with a meaning that diverges from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Le Bouch inadvertently uses the expression body-lived as a phase of human development, making it the genesis of all human mobility, as it is the formation of the body image from the preoperative to the operative motor learning phase. However, the lived body, for phenomenology, is the incarnated body, lived in its total existence. His whole life would be his lived body.

To further open up the understanding of the phases of psychomotor development in Le Bouch, let us think about the phases.

The stage of the "perceived body" is the same as the "body schema", as follows:

> Prior to this period, this concept has no foundation, insofar as it describes a perceptual activity whose development will only be possible after the function of interiorization (In note: perceptual function that makes it possible to shift attention from the environment to one's "own body" in order to reach awareness) reaches maturity. (p.16)

This education through movement, which Le Bouch proposes, still preserves the tradition of a vision of the human being structured in a separation between body (movement)

and reason. A mechanical and reductionist form for the human being, as we will see later when presenting phenomenology in this text.

The mirror for Le Bouch, is the contact with the body image, the visual image of his body, it becomes the reference where tactile and kinesthetic sensations provide the details to structure the "body schema" that is formed from the relationships between sensory data, resulting from the fusion of the visual image and the coenesthetic image of the body.

The "represented body" phase, the phase of entering primary school, allows the 12-year-old child to have an image of the "operative body" from which he can exercise his availability, both on the outside world and on his own motor skills.

Until the age of six, there is a mental representation, a static reproductive image, formed from the close association between visual data and (kinesthetic) movements. This is the same idea as the cognitivist associationist psychologist. The knowledge, the perception of the body is given by associations.

> The evolution of cognitive functions, contemporaneous with the "phase of concrete operations", will evolve this image of the body from being a reproducer to simply becoming "anticipating". (p. 16)

Note that here is exposed the whole of associative psychology, in which cognition forms the operative phases of movement. The domain of movement becomes a cognitive operation. This is totally different from the sense of the perception of movement for phenomenology. At first, it is already possible to think that associationist psychology starts from structures prior to the movement for it to occur, and only occurs in the different phases of development. Consciousness of movement always has a cognitive and psychomotor sense, in a logical sequence of movements, which differs radically from consciousness for phenomenology, which is always consciousness of something. An awareness of the world with others.

However, when focusing on the acquisition of technique and the best way to execute the movement, the correct way to execute the movement Le Bouch (1987) starts from this image that the subject has of the gesture and in this sense will depend on the phase that is connected to the whole system, linking them to the developmental system of learning by stages, being a construction of thought identically to Piaget.

Le Bouch op. cit. I was writing about psychokinetics and gestural learning and it is for this theme, the human gesture, that this article compares how gesture (movement) is thought of by Le Bouch's Psychokinetic approach and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology.

First, however, it is still necessary to present the approaches to motor learning and developmental in Physical Education.

The approach to motor learning, Schmidt (1993) has a path contrary to that of Le Bouch's Psychokinetics (1987), in which one can improve the cognitive aspects, therefore of reason, through or by learning the basic movements of the human being. Motor learning, North American Physical Education, does not have movement as a means but an end in itself in its highest performance, thus, it is the extreme, that is, to show the dominance of reason over movement, and that this is commanded by reason. Therefore, an approach that focuses on wanting to explain how the human being, in this case the athlete, reaches his maximum performance to the point of becoming a spectacle. In this way, it remains much more in a behavioral psychology of Skiner, with emphasis on the stimuli of games, sports, in the phase of beginners to professional athletes of high level as performative as possible.

It will not be possible to detail this approach due to the space provided, however it is enough to point out that it is an approach that explains a behavior without having the understanding of what really happens and what made the athlete achieve his performance. It stays on the objective outside and forgets to study the perception of movement as it happens.

The developmental approach to Physical Education is a perspective that is based on motor development and motor learning. It considers the characteristics of each age group and the maturational advances of each individual.

However, the developmental approach to Physical Education Go Tani et. al. (1988) is also a model of psychology of human behavior in its essence. A psychology that influenced from then on the entire basis of the school. With the foundation of all this developmental psychology of human behavior, the study of stimulus and response in education governed by empirical-experimental science was then passed. Its objective would be to understand the processes that occur in the individual when having a stimulus and producing a response, however, the method used was that of definitions, concepts and principles designed in a mechanistic way and in a reductionism that ended up defining the Being as a pile of organs juxtaposed in a body disconnected from the mind, including, in this mental aspect, cognition separated from motor behavior and even more segmenting the Being into affective, social,

cognitive aspects. Psychologies that treat the Human Being in segments to study it cannot understand either the stimuli, or even the response, of a movement, much less understand the Human Being as a single Being situated in the world with the others. But the positivist sciences only seek to take the opposite path and always want to separate the being into domains, behaviors, aspects, cognitive, affective and social, and motor, in order to study it, they end up reducing it and removing it from the world, isolating it in an artificial situation of human behavior, and study separately the motor aspects, in experiments that are mathematical models of solving factual problems of facts created from cause and effect relations and that contribute little or nothing to to understand the human being, at most to arrive at explanations that are intended to be generalizing.

3 MERLEAU'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS DIFFERENCES WITH LE BOUCH'S PSYCHOKINETICS, SCHMIT'S MOTOR LEARNING AND GOTANI'S DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES

At first, the notion of body image, or body image, for Le Bouch, goes a long way, it differs greatly from the notion of perception of the body-self of phenomenology. Le Bouch will resort to psychoanalysis to show the construction of this body image that can suffer external and internal forces and is established between these two forces, generating the impetus of movement. To expose here the understanding of the unconscious in Freud and Merleau-Ponty, it would be necessary to have one more article. As this essay deals with Physical Education and its methodologies to teach and improve human movement, I will concentrate at this moment on putting Le Bouch's Psychokinetics face to face with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, in his visions of the human gesture.

Le Bouch (1987) begins his idea of gesture by citing his other book: Towards the Science of Movement. This book was published in 1987. The work used in this 1987 article is the Portuguese translation, that is, his book Educação Psicomotora. Psychokinetics at school age, the original work is from 1984.

> The purpose of psychomotor education is not the acquisition of gestural skills. However, psychomotor work, as we conceive it, results in a better aptitude for learning, within the respect for the child's development. In particular, at the end of primary schooling between 10 and 12 years of age, the child who has an "image of the operative body" (in note: In the sense given by Piaget: the child is capable of providing himself with an "internalized model" of this or that movement), as a consequence of

> methodical work aimed at his own body, becomes capable of "secondary learning". (40)

It is quite clear a vision of the body, the vision of Physical Education. The vision of a segmented body that thinks and acts. It is simply the same associationist psychology of communication and language proposes where up to two machines can communicate. For these psychological and linguistic currents, an understanding is given as a light is turned on. It is clear that movement for Le Bouch is a response of the cognition of something that has been structured in the body, an image recorded in an unconscious that is available and that allows the child to have his operative moment in which he can perform the movements that were previously internalized and recorded as a deposit of images that are available for the movement to be performed.

Merleau-Ponty simply breaks with Pavlov's physiology and classical reflexology because he was able to experience the infirmary of a battlefront, and do his entire master's thesis in the structure of behavior and his doctorate in the phenomenology of Perception, it is, therefore, a rereading of reflexology, any physiological approach to Physical Education and others linked to classical and mechanistic psychologies. It focuses on the study of phantom limbs, amputees who still felt their limbs.

> The progress of the injury of the nervous substance, however, does not destroy one by one the sensible contents made, but makes more and more uncertain the active differentiation of the excitations, which appears as the essential function of the nervous system. In the same way, in the case of non-cortical lesions of tactile sensitivity, if some contents (temperatures) are more fragile and disappear first, it is not because a specific territory, destroyed in the patient, serves us to feel hot and cold – because the specific sensation will be restored if a very long stimulant is applied (...). The central lesions seem to leave the qualities intact and, however, they modify the spatial organization of the data and the perception of the objects. (p.87)

What Merleau-Ponty shows is that lesions change the direction of the stimulus or its intensity, they can respond to a thermal, but not tactile, stimulus.

> Thus excitations of the same sense differ less in the material instrument of which they are used, than in the manner in which the elementary stimuli are spontaneously organized; and this organization is the decisive factor at the level of sensible "qualities" as well as at the level of perception. It is still, and not the specific energy of the apparatus questioned, that causes an excitant to give way to a tactile sensation or a thermal sensation. If a specific region of the skin is aroused several times with a hair, one first has punctual perceptions, clearly distinguished, and each time located at the

same point. As the excitement is repeated, the location becomes less precise, the perception spreads through the space, at the same time that the sensation ceases to be specific: it is no longer a contact, it is a burn, sometimes due to the cold, sometimes due to the heat. Later still, the subject believes that the stimulant moves and traces a circle on his skin. In the end, nothing is felt anymore. This means that the "sensible quality", the spatial determinations of the perceived, and even the presence or absence of a perception, are not effects of the actual situation, external to the organism, but represent the way in which it comes to meet the stimuli and refers to them. An excitation is not perceived when it reaches a sensory organ that is not "in accord" with it. The function of the organism in receiving stimuli is, so to speak, to "conceive" a certain form of excitation. The "psychophysical event" is no longer of the type of mundane causality, the brain becomes a place of "formation" (miseen forme) that intervenes even before the cortical stage, and that disturbs, from the entrance of the nervous system, the relations between stimulus and the organism. The excitement is taken and reorganized by transversal functions that make it resemble the perception it is going to arouse. This form that is outlined in the nervous system, this unfolding of a structure, I cannot represent them as a series of processes in the third person, as a transmission of movement or the determination of one variable by another. I cannot take any other notice of this fact. If I guess what it may be, it is left there the body object, parts extra parts, and directing myself to the body of which I have the present experience, e.g., the manner in which my hand envelops the object it touches, anticipating its stimuli and outlining itself the form which rises up towards the world. (p.88)

Here, then, is the reformulation of the entire mechanistic, physiological and behavioral theory, which has hung for centuries in the segmentation of the human being and in his incomprehension in not wanting to accept that it is not only the stimulus, but the quality of this stimulus and its form.

It is impossible to show all the clarity of the philosopher when he speaks to us precisely:

Thus, exteroceptivity requires a donation of form to the stimuli; The consciousness of the body invades the body, the soul spreads everywhere, the behavior invades its central sector. But it might be replied that this "experience of the body" is itself a "representation," a "psychic fact," and that in this sense it is at the end of a chain of physical and physiological events which alone can be attributed to the "real body." My body is not, just like the external bodies, an object which acts upon receptors, and which finally gives place to the consciousness of the body. There is no "interoceptivity" in it, as well as an "exteroceptivity". I cannot find in the body threads which the internal organs send to the brain, and which are instituted by nature to give the soul the opportunity to feel its body. The consciousness of the body and the soul are thus forced, the body becomes again that very clean machine that the ambiguous notion of behavior has been about to make us forget. If, for example, in an amputee, some stimulation replaces that of his leg, on the path from the leg to the brain, the subject

will feel a phantom leg, because the soul is immediately united to the brain and to the brain alone. (p.88 and 89)

Now there is no other way. We need to continue this analysis of the Merleau-pontyana phantom member.

What does modern physiology say about this? Cocaine anesthesia does not suppress the phantom limb, there are phantom limbs without any amputation and soon after brain injuries. Finally, the phantom limb often retains the very position that the royal arm occupied at the time of the wound: a war wounded person still feels in his phantom arm the shrapnel of howitzers that lacerated his royal arm. Should we therefore replace the "peripheral theory" with a "central theory"? But a central theory would gain us nothing if it did not add to the peripheral conditions of the phantom limb anything but celebratory traits. Because a set of celebratory traits could not configure the relations of consciousness that intervene in the phenomenon. It depends, in fact, on "psychic" determinants; An emotion, a circumstance reminiscent of those of the wound, causes a phantom limb to reappear in subjects who did not have it. It happens that the phantom arm, huge after the operation, then retracts to finally swallow itself in the room "with the consent of the patient to accept his mutilation".

It is very difficult not to dwell on the question of the phantom limb and the learning of movement in Physical Education, Merleau-Ponty op.cit., demonstrates how intellectualist and developmentalist psychologies are on another path.

The phenomenon of the phantom limb is clarified here by the phenomenon of anosognosia, which visibly demands a psychological explanation. Subjects who systematically ignore their paralyzed right hand and extend their left hand when asked for their right hand, speak, however, of their paralyzed arm as a "long, cold serpent." Is it then to be said that the phantom limb is a memory, a will, or a belief, and, in the absence of a physiological explanation, to give it a psychological explanation? However, no psychological explanation can ignore that the sectioning of sensitive conductors that go in the direction of the brain suppresses the phantom limb. It is therefore necessary to understand how psychic determinants and physiological conditions are linked to each other; It is not conceivable how the phantom limb, if it depends on physiological conditions and if, in this sense, it is the effect of a causality in the third person, can on the other hand dispense with the history of the patient, his memories, his emotions, his wills. (p.90)

Moving on to the next three pages in Merleau-Ponty op.cit, which also, quickly shows how the authors speak of a "repression" or of an "organic repression" when describing the belief of the phantom limb.

Let us return to the problem from which we came from. Anosognosia and phantom limb do not admit of a physiological explanation, nor a psychological explanation, nor a mixed explanation, although they can be linked to both sets of conditions. A physiological interpretation would interpret anosognosia and the phantom limb as the simple suppression or the simple persistence of interreceptive stimuli. In this hypothesis, anosognosia is the absence of a fragment of the representation of the body that should be given, because the corresponding member is there, the phantom member is the presence of a part of the representation in the body that should not be given, because the corresponding member is not there. If a psychological explanation is now given of the phenomena, the phantom limb becomes a memory, a positive judgment or a perception, anosognosia a forgetfulness, a negative judgment or an imperceptiveness. In the first case, the phantom limb is the effective presence of a representation, anosognosia, the absence of a representation. In the second case, the phantom limb is the representation of an effective presence, anosognosia is the representation of an effective absence. In both cases, we do not leave the categories of the objective world where there is no middle between presence and absence. In reality, the anosognosic does not care simply about the paralyzed limb, he cannot move away from the disability except because he knows where he would run the risk of finding it, just as the subject, in psychoanalysis, knows what he does not want to see in front of him, without which he could not avoid it so well. We do not understand the absence or death of a friend until we expect an answer from him and when we feel that it will no longer exist, we also avoid first questioning so as not to have to perceive this silence, we move away from regions of our life where we could find this nothingness, but this means that we guess them. In the same way, the anasognosic puts his paralyzed arm out of the game so as not to feel its loss, but it means that he has a preconscious knowledge. It is true that in the case of the phantom limb the subject seems to be ignorant of his mutilation and counts on his phantom as on his real limb, for he tries to walk with the phantom leg and does not allow himself to be discouraged by a fall. But he describes very well the peculiarities of the phantom leg, for example its particular motor skills, and if he treats it practically as a real limb, it is that, like the normal subject, he does not have the need to walk on the street of a clear and articulated perception of his body; it is enough for him to have it at "his disposal" as an undivided force, and to guess the phantom leg vaguely implies it. The consciousness of the phantom leg thus also becomes equivocal. The amputee feels his leg as I can vividly feel the existence of a friend who is not, however, under my eyes, he has not lost it because he continues to count on it, as Proust can well verify the death of his grandmother without losing it while he was waiting for her on the horizon of his life. The phantom arm is not a representation of the arm, but the equivalent presence of an arm. The refusal of mutilation in the case of the phantom limb or the refusal of the disability in anosognosia, does not take place at the level of tactical consciousness that takes a position explicitly after having considered different possibilities. The desire to have a healthy body or the refusal of the sick body are not formulated by themselves, the experience of the amputated arm as present or of the sick as absent are not of the order of "I think that..." (p.93 and 94)

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy extends far, but what he wants to say is also in line with a whole vision of the unconscious that re-signifies the idea of the unconscious no

longer in its physical sense that Freud wanted as a negation and what Merleau Ponty shows is not wanting to speak, hides because it does not want to see.

To finish:

> Man concretely taken is not a psyche united to an organism, but this to-and-fro that sometimes allows itself to be corporeal and sometimes directs itself to personal acts. Psychological motives and bodily occasions can be intertwined because it is not a single movement in a living body that is an absolute chance in relation to psychic intentions, nor a single psychic act that has not at least found its germ or its general design in physiological dispositions. It is never a question of the incomprehensible meeting of two causalities, nor of a collision between the order of causes and the order of ends. But by an insensible modification an organic process arrives at a human behavior, an instinctive act turns and becomes a feeling, or conversely a human act awakens and continues absentmindedly as a reflex. Between the psychic and the physiological there may be exchange relations that almost always prevent the definition of a mental disorder as psychic or somatic. The so-called somatic disorder outlines psychic comments on the theme of the organic accident, and the "psychic" disorder is limited to developing the human significance of the bodily event. (p101)

How then to distinguish in the symptoms the physiological causes and the psychological motives? How can we simply associate the two explanations and how can we conceive of a point of junction between the two determinants? In symptoms of this kind, psychic and physical are so inwardly linked that one can no longer think of completing one of the functional domains by the other, and that the two must be taken over by a third. For Merleau-Ponty, it is necessary to move from a knowledge of psychological and physiological facts to a recognition of a psychic event as a vital process inherent to our existence. The author ends his first item of the first part of his book phenomenology of perception: The body as an object of mechanistic physiology with a quotation that states that the psychophysical event can no longer be conceived in the manner of Cartesian physiology and as the continuity of a process in itself and of a cogitatio. "The union of soul and body is not sealed by an arbitrary decree between two external terms, one object, the other subject. It completes itself at every moment in the movement of existence." That is, existence always comes before thought, it is the first way of access.

It is necessary to differentiate the vision of the body for Merleau-Ponty from body image, the body schema of the psychologies of representations that founds all thought and directs practice in Physical Education. I also intend to focus on the vision of what the human gesture is for Psychokinetics and phenomenology.

4 THE BODY AS EXPRESSION AND SPEECH MERLEAU-PONTY

Returning to this chapter of the book of the phenomenology of Perception is always very pleasurable and rewarding. I had already carefully pored over this chapter from my published article Lima (1991), in which I deal with the limitation of language and human discourse, in which I developed the philosopher's idea of the body as expression and speech, trying to show that the body is not a decoded language ready to be used. The body has its speech and this is not speech. Speech allows something to be seen. The body, therefore, does not have a language, but a logos, a discourse that reveals and hides the meaning of Being.

Merleau-Ponty (1971) resumes by stating that he recognizes for the body a unity distinct from that of the object of science. Then he will again stick to the intentionality and awareness of speech and will dwell for a long time on the origin of speech in the child.

> The possession of language is first understood as the simple effective existence of "verbal images", that is, of traces left in us by the words spoken and heard. Whether these traits are bodily or deposited in an "unconscious psyche" does not matter much, and in both cases the conception of language is the same as follows: there is no "speaking subject". That the stimuli capable of provoking the articulation of the word, or that the states of consciousness cause, by virtue of the acquired associations, the appearance of the convenient verbal image, in both cases speech is located in a circuit of phenomena in the third person, there is no one who speaks, there is a flow of words that are produced without any intention of speaking governing them.

Merleau-Ponty (1977) presenting the theory of aphasia or the true aphasia that comes with the disturbances of intelligence. Also, the author makes us think of automatic language that is effectively a motor phenomenon in the third person, an intentional language. The author makes us understand that in aphasia, which is this phenomenon in the third person, an intentional language, the individuality of the "verbal image" are effectively dissociated. What the patient with aphasia lost was not a stock or arsenal of words, but the way to use them. Let us see in the words of the philosopher.

> The same word, which remains available to the patient on the level of automatic language, is removed from him on the level of gratuitous language: the same patient who finds the word "no" without difficulty in order to refuse the doctor's questions, that is, when it means a current and lived denial, is unable to utter it when it is an exercise without affective and vital interest. Behind the word, an attitude, a function of speech that conditions the patient. The word is distinguished as an instrument of action and as a means of disinterested denomination. (p.185 and 186)

The gesture is speech and it is movement, for Le Bouch that in his psychomotor education it is not the search for the acquisition of these gestural skills, movements, but a preparation within the respect for the child's developmental phases that will form an image of the operative body, an "internalized model" that will enable secondary learning.

Merleau-Ponty (1971) shows us that there is no thought behind the gesture. Gestures are pre-verbal elements, they appear before the word and the word explains it. Gestural communication is made and the emphasis is not on language, but on the expression of the body. For Merleau-Ponty, I do not have a physical body and an intellect that commands this body through representations of images of the body itself. For Ponty, I am body, I am space, I am time, I am movement. Therefore, gesture is action, movement. Speech is a gesture.

What the philosopher reports is that the meaning of the gesture is already the gesture itself, breaking with the intellectualist cognitive psychological theories that think of a body image and the gesture as being an intellectual, cognitive process and in this way executing a gesture would be a representation, which would depend on words definitions to be understood a gesture by its spectator. For Merleau-Ponty it makes us understand the aspect of culture engraved in us.

> The word is a true gesture and contains its meaning as the gesture contains its own. It is what makes communication possible. In order for me to understand the words of the other, it is evidently necessary that their vocabulary and syntax are already "known" to me. But this does not mean that words act by arousing in me "representations" that would be associated with them and whose set would end up reproducing in me the original "representation" of the speaker. (p.194)

Merleau-Poty (1971) clarifies that the gesture is not a response to a cognitive and intellectual process, as well as dwelling in depth on how the spectator of the gesture perceives the gesture and that it is also not necessary to have an intellectuality and logical reasoning that needs to translate the gesture.

Merleau-Ponty (1971), makes us think about everything at the same time. However, from what it was possible to bring to light of Merleau-Pontyan understanding, I end this article with the vision of communication and the word.

> It is not with "representations" or with a thought that I communicate first, but with a speaking subject, with a certain style of being and with the "world" that he aims at. In the same way that intention means that you have moved the word of the other is not an explicit thought, but a certain lack that seeks to be fulfilled, in the same way the

> resumption by me of this intention is not an operation of my thought, but a synchronic modulation of my existence, a transformation of my being. We live in a world where the word is instituted. For all these banal words, we have in us meanings already formed. They arouse in us only second thoughts, these in turn are translated into other words which do not require any real effort of expression from us and will not ask our listeners for any effort of understanding. The linguistic world seems to go on its own. The linguistic and intersubjective world no longer surprises us, we no longer distinguish it from the world itself, and it is within a world that is already spoken and speaking that we reflect. (p. 194)

To understand that the body does not have a prior language, that all the meaning of the gesture is culturally given, and that it can only be understood, contextualized and situated in the world, and that it is given to our understanding. This differentiated view of the body, of movement, of communication, of gesture that this philosopher brings us, allows us to say that it is up to Physical Education professionals, pedagogues and all those who use the body as an educational form, to reread the views of the approaches exposed in this text so that a new meaning emerges for what is taught and what is learned in Physical Education.

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