

**BETWEEN THE PRESERVATION OF FREEDOM AND RATIONALITY:
ANALYSES BY JOHN DEWEY AND HERBERT MARCUSE**

**ENTRE A PRESERVAÇÃO DA LIBERDADE E A RACIONALIDADE: ANÁLISES
DE JOHN DEWEY E HERBERT MARCUSE**

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to present, starting from Chapter 1 (The Problem of Liberty) of one of Dewey's works entitled "Liberalism, Liberty and Culture," where he uses the idea of liberty to arrive at two basic questions: first, the tension he exposes throughout, between the foundations of liberty and its preservation. And second, the idea of the principles or possible relationships between liberty and social cohesion or solidarity, which are the issues at stake in the first two paragraphs of the text, grouping several questions around these references. In the second part of the work, we analyze the introduction and Chapter 1 of Herbert Marcuse's work "The Ideology of Industrial Society." For Marcuse, modern industrial society imposes a technological rationality of mass domination and oppression, of control over human consciousness. The man who finds himself inserted in the society of artificiality is not free; on the contrary, he is an automaton, incapable of opposing the system of the technological apparatus. There is a satisfaction of false needs, which causes the so-called "mechanics of conformity." This paper seeks to reproduce and reflect upon the critical social theory developed by Marcuse regarding the new ideology of advanced technological society.

Keywords: John Dewey. Herbert Marcuse. Freedom.

RESUMO

Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar, a partir do capítulo 1 (O Problema da Liberdade) de uma das obras de Dewey intitulada "Liberalismo, Liberdade e Cultura", onde ele usa a idéia de liberdade para chegar a duas questões básicas: primeiro, a tensão que ele expõe todo momento, dos fundamentos da liberdade e de sua conservação. E depois, a idéia dos princípios ou relações possíveis entre liberdade e coesão social ou solidariedade que são as questões que estão em jogo nos dois primeiros parágrafos do texto que agrupam várias perguntas em torno dessas referências. Na segunda parte do trabalho, analisamos a introdução e capítulo 1 da obra "A Ideologia da Sociedade Industrial", de Herbert Marcuse. Para Marcuse, a sociedade industrial moderna impõe uma racionalidade tecnológica, de dominação e opressão em massas, de controle das consciências humanas. O homem que se encontra inserido na sociedade do artificialismo não é livre, ao contrário, é um ser

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autômato, incapaz de se opor ao sistema do aparato tecnológico. Há uma satisfação das necessidades falsas, que ocasiona a denominada “mecânica do conformismo”. O presente trabalho busca reproduzir e pensar a teoria social crítica, desenvolvida por Marcuse sobre a nova ideologia da sociedade tecnológica avançada.

Palavras-chave: John Dewey. Herbert Marcuse. Liberdade.

RESÚMEN

Este artículo se propone presentar, a partir del Capítulo 1 (El Problema de la Libertad) de una de las obras de Dewey titulada "Liberalismo, Libertad y Cultura", donde utiliza la idea de libertad para abordar dos cuestiones fundamentales: primero, la tensión que expone a lo largo del texto entre los fundamentos de la libertad y su preservación. Y segundo, la idea de los principios o posibles relaciones entre la libertad y la cohesión social o la solidaridad, que son los temas que se abordan en los dos primeros párrafos del texto, agrupando varias preguntas en torno a estas referencias. En la segunda parte del trabajo, analizamos la introducción y el Capítulo 1 de la obra de Herbert Marcuse "La Ideología de la Sociedad Industrial". Para Marcuse, la sociedad industrial moderna impone una racionalidad tecnológica de dominación y opresión masiva, de control sobre la conciencia humana. El hombre que se encuentra inmerso en la sociedad de la artificialidad no es libre; al contrario, es un autómata, incapaz de oponerse al sistema del aparato tecnológico. Se produce una satisfacción de falsas necesidades, lo que da lugar a la llamada "mecánica del conformismo". Este artículo busca reproducir y reflexionar sobre la teoría social crítica desarrollada por Marcuse respecto a la nueva ideología de la sociedad tecnológica avanzada.

Palabras clave: John Dewey. Herbert Marcuse. Libertad.



1 INTRODUCTION

John Dewey (1859-1952) is the most recognized American educator of the twentieth century. In a prolific career that spanned seven decades, Dewey focused on a wide range of concerns, especially and notably in the fields of philosophy, education, psychology, sociology and politics. Both during his lifetime and after his death, Dewey's writings and public positions have been subject to interpretation and reinterpretation by various scholars. There is a voluminous literature on him, or written by himself, with profoundly different assessments of the nature and impact of his work.

Herbert Marcuse (1898 – 1979) was a German philosopher of Jewish origin, naturalized American during the Nazi period. Marcuse was, along with Adorno and Horkheimer, one of the founders of the Frankfurt School. Much of his work was based on two central theses: the analogy between the liberation of the masses (alienated by capitalism) and the erotic liberation of the unconscious (repressed by the conscious).

The objective of this reflection is to analyze studies by John Dewey and Herbert Marcuse from the perspective of freedom, bringing a correlation from the proximity of psychological and psychoanalytic theories. To do so, we used two texts by the authors to reflect on the possibilities of freedom in each writing, and bringing the readings closer together through content analysis.

The first question in Dewey arises from the idea of the foundations of freedom and its conservation that are linked in the sequence of the author's discussion, the genesis of a society that fights against oppression, which in this case is American society. And the second is about the possible relations between freedom around social cohesion or solidarity. From the first we find a very interesting point that will connect with Marcuse's text, but with a little more particularities or particularisms. But what is interesting in both cases is to see how a liberal author, such as Dewey, discusses issues that advance to principles that are then reworked from the perspective of an author of critical theory, of the Frankfurt School, such as Herbert Marcuse.

The idea that allows the two "theories" to be brought together is based on two factors that are recognizable in the texts. One is the question of thinking about the idea of freedom as a counterpoint to a conception of totalitarianism or a totalizing conception. In the case of Dewey, he reflects on the Totalitarian State, because he is thinking about the crisis of the Totalitarian State, his text is from 1939. In the case of Marcuse, the 1964 text reflects on the totalizing society, which is the Social Welfare State.

So there are elements that separate these two texts: one is the issue that totalitarianism is not the same thing as totalizing, but the second element perhaps that we should think is the dimension of the influences of psychological and psychoanalytic theories in the reading of the two authors. In Dewey's case, psychological theory and, in Marcuse's case, the question of psychoanalysis. This implies putting the dimension of the individual or individualities at stake in these relationships. This helps to understand how these two dialogues, even thinking that they are authors of very different schools, arrive at conceptions of a certain correlation.

2 METHODOLOGY

The analysis proposed in this study was based on the hermeneutic-dialectical method, appropriate for investigations that seek to understand the interaction between meanings, social practices and power structures. This approach, inspired by the interpretations of Habermas' (1987) studies on communicative action and by the hermeneutical bases developed by Gadamer (GONZALES, 1987), allows for the critical articulation of objective and subjective elements present in the construction of the concepts of freedom, rationality and technology discussed by John Dewey and Herbert Marcuse in their works by DEWEY, John, *Liberalism, Freedom and Culture* (1970) and MARCUSE, Herbert, *The Ideology of Industrial Society* (1964).

The adoption of the hermeneutic-dialectical method was justified by the interpretative nature of the problem investigated. As Minayo (2002) points out, this method makes it possible to examine social phenomena based on the interdependence between language, experience and historical context, understanding that all meaning is constituted through symbols — discourses, norms, values and categories — that structure human action. Thus, this study treated the texts of Dewey and Marcuse as symbolic units loaded with intentionality, whose interpretation requires considering their historical conditions of production and the ways in which they articulate meanings about freedom and technology.

The analytical process was carried out in three main stages:

1. Comprehensive reading and reconstruction of the authors' discourse, seeking to identify categories present in the analyzed works of Dewey and Marcuse. This stage allowed us to recognize the main nuclei of meaning presented by the authors.
2. Hermeneutic interpretation, in which the conceptual content was analyzed in the light of the meanings attributed by the authors themselves and the theoretical tradition in

which they are inserted. Language was treated as a mediator of action in the world, as defended by Gonzalez (1987), allowing us to understand how each author articulates his conception of freedom in relation to the social and technological conditions of his time.

3. Dialectical integration of categories, considering the tension between the perspectives of Dewey — who understands freedom as an experimental and free process — and the criticisms of Marcuse — who problematizes the capture of subjectivity by technical rationality. At this stage, the analysis sought to show how objectivity and subjectivity are intertwined in the theoretical formulation of both authors, as suggested by Minayo (2002), and how this relationship produces different meanings about the possibility of autonomy in the technological society.

With this approach, it was possible to understand freedom not only as an abstract concept, but as a historical and symbolic process, configured by the production, interpretation and dispute of meanings. The hermeneutic-dialectic methodology, therefore, allowed us to deepen the understanding of the differences and convergences between Dewey and Marcuse, highlighting how both conceive freedom from the relationship between subject, language and social context.

3 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

In the following pages, we show the issue of freedom in each author, John Dewey and Herbert Marcuse, and then make the intended approximations.

3.1 FREEDOM IN DEWEY

From this set of initial positions, we start from Dewey, the foundations of freedom and its conservation and the idea of possible relations between freedom and cohesion, in the first paragraphs, where it is possible to develop the analysis of the conditions made possible by political freedom in his time (1939), based on the crisis of the Totalitarian State. When he writes about the crisis of the Totalitarian State, he refers to the Soviet states, on the one hand, the dimension that is somewhat confused with the conception of the Totalitarian State, but already with several denunciations in this period, of the abuses caused by the Soviet socialist regime. But he is also thinking of the pre-World War II period (rise of Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy). I mean, Dewey is thinking of a framework

where totalitarian regimes are present. This framework will also be discussed, later by the Frankfurt School, but from a different logic, emphasizing much more the dimension of psychology, which is the idea of the authoritarian personality (Adorno-Horkheimer). This is a period of threat from totalitarianism to democratic life. It is in this context that Dewey is thinking about political freedom.

Dewey begins by analyzing that the conception of freedom is thought of in America as an impulse of human nature that founds society itself. The author refers to "it is in our tradition to be the love of freedom inherent in its structure" (Dewey, 1970, p. 99), at this point in the text Dewey is thinking about the writings of Thomas Jefferson, the issue of the still rural conception of an American society that fought for independence, sought to free itself from oppression, and which is based on the conception of a natural right to freedom, conceptions of an American democracy.

Dewey will unfold in the text, from the perspective that it is the structural tradition of American society to love freedom, a belief to the ethics that political democracy is a moral right and that the laws on which it is based are fundamental moral laws to which any and all forms of social organization must obey. In a kind of what he calls the popular psychology of democracy. Dewey, in the quotation from Thomas Jefferson's correspondence with John Adams, highlights the disbelief that Thomas Jefferson makes explicit in public opinion as a practical factor that destroys the legal affirmation of freedom.

He identifies the influence of public opinion in the context of the theoretical foundations based on the laws that guarantee freedom as a natural right. As public opinion, Dewey thinks of the press, the dissemination of customs, a model of transformation of American society that is gradually moving from an agrarian society to an urban society. And as for this, from his conception (Thomas Jefferson), it distorts that original conception of freedom as a right inscribed in human nature. From this perspective, Dewey questions the possibility of political freedom being maintained without freedom of culture. From his perspective, political freedom is insufficient to explain the proper functioning of political institutions.

Since,

[...] the relationships that exist between people, outside political institutions, relations of industry, communication, science, art, religion, affect daily associations and contacts and, therefore, profoundly affect the attitudes and habits expressed by the government and norms of law (DEWEY, 1970, p. 100).



So, he says, Thomas Jefferson's conception seems to be one in which government should govern according to natural laws, outside the influence of public opinion. That is subject to cultural changes. Dewey wonders to what extent it is possible, then, for democratic institutions to preserve naturalized conceptions of freedom exempt from cultural changes. For him, cultural changes condition changes in the form of social organization. "The freedom from oppression and repression, which existed previously, marked a necessary transition, but transitions are only bridges to something different" (DEWEY, 1970, p. 101).

Starting from the idea of the reference of militancy, the reference of social struggle that constituted a certain generation of Brazilian society that fought against the dictatorship, sometimes remains without necessarily understanding how the democratic transition occurred and how the democratic transition presents itself, the struggles for the inscription of achievements, of demands, in the text of the law or in the constitutional text, they are only a bridge to something that Dewey calls "something different". So sometimes the criticism of the absence of militancy that would be, in the view of some authors, especially in Brazil, something extremely important to understand the achievements of the process of redemocratization of Brazilian society, and a criticism is made of these new collective actions and social struggles, as if they were devoid of social criticism. As if they were devoid of a broader awareness of the historical needs that led to the process of democracy in Brazilian society.

Dewey's conception, in this sense, helps to understand that the transition only liberates forms that the struggle against oppression absorbed into an abstract homogeneity. When the struggle against oppression passes, and there is no longer a common enemy for society as a whole, it is proper that differences appear, as for example, in the post-constituent period, in Brazil, when the muffled differences, in the homogeneous struggle of all against oppression, begin to manifest themselves. More important than the transition is often to understand the differences that appear and how the transition served as a bridge to these differences.

Dewey takes up Thomas Jefferson and his fear of public opinion, to develop arguments of two kinds of relations: on the one hand, it is possible to perceive, for example, in the West, but also in America in general, from where he is thinking, an industrial development, an urban development, which corresponds in a certain way, to the physical

and material principle of development that explains the reason and the information that accompany the changes operated by the economy and science.

On the other hand, it is possible to recognize a development of emotions and imagination that accompanies the areas (much less valued). So this material, physical dimension that is present as the great influencer of the principles or cultural factors that condition public opinion, which Thomas Jefferson feared so much, which must be complemented, according to Dewey, by the understanding of how the emotions and imagination that accompany cultural changes developed. From this perspective, the author says that the references of freedom are composed from the scientific-economic bases and the cultural bases of democracy. And that these bases are corresponding and inseparable in the analysis of democratic or totalitarian political institutions. If the physical or material development of society makes it possible to clarify or measure the exteriority of human relations, which can be captured, for example, by the idea of growth, by the idea of industrialization, by the idea of urbanization, by the idea of contrasts produced by the apprehension of laws and several other possibilities. The development of values arising from cultural bases also makes it possible to clarify human relations. In other words, in the case of Dewey this will be evident in the analysis of totalitarian regimes, as a material command and of the imagination and in the way in which in the imagination and with it all the emotional impulses that we are accustomed to calling *interior* (Dewey, 1970, p. 104), are controlled.

For him, there are a variety of factors involved in the problem of human freedom (Dewey, 1970, p. 107), on which the need to perceive whether any factor is so predominant that it has causal force. In the first text, Dewey, in summary, explains that in the reason with which the idea of freedom is thought of as a natural right, as something that is the foundation of a concept of society, there is a whole development that is intended to be immutable to cultural influences. This is not possible without understanding the influences of cultural factors, of cultural changes, in the political life of society, one does not understand what is understood as freedom in a society, because it is loaded with values and these values are defined from the changes and influences that these cultural changes cause in political institutions. The norms change, the laws change, the form of government changes, which is updated at least to this principle.

Dewey explains why these changes are difficult to understand in democracy. According to him, the ideal of democracy is based on the assumption that the idea of

freedom is natural, in American society, where he analyzes it. To this end, he goes to the analysis of the Totalitarian State to show that for the Totalitarian State to be established, it stifles the individual impulses and motives of the subjects. It psychologically affects the subjects by controlling impulses and motives. And it is this control that allows totalitarianism, in a certain way, to reproduce itself in the stifling of individuality. So the idea of imagination, material command and imagination are complementary in the analysis of relations and conceptions of freedom, which exists in a certain society.

Now there are a variety of factors that need to be highlighted from this variety, the issue of culture, various conceptions, such as religion, art, theater, music, which in a way directly influences the way people start to read the world, to have worldviews that value people's possibilities of fulfillment in very different ways. The ideal of freedom varies with this and is not just a matter of determination or physical and material conditioning. At this point, Dewey makes a criticism of the Marxist conception that sees the question of the preponderance of the economic in these relations.

It poses new problems in the sequence. One is about the datum of psychological control – control of the emotional pulses that we usually call interior. Which ultimately seeks to stifle people's imagination. Another thing he will say is, if the issue of freedom varies according to the factors involved in his problem, it is important to try to understand if a factor is preponderant in a way that can oppose its causal force. Dewey, analyzing at the time he is writing (1939), says that the belief in economic predominance prevails, hence his dialogue with Marxism. He says that today it has become fashionable to say that the economy is the cause of this or that. But he remembers that it cannot be forgotten that at the time of the Enlightenment reason was preponderant. Then, in a passage, he goes back to the Middle Ages to say that religion was preponderant. If we go back to antiquity, the preponderant were myths and rituals as a way of controlling these drives of the subject, of individuals, which are stifled as a function of a collective, and of the norms that govern collective cohesion in these societies.

In the case of Totalitarian States, Dewey highlights another order of relations between the factors that act on political institutions and the organization of psychologically-based social life, which indicate the direction of a logic of pluralist analysis. So these conceptions such as the Marxist conception, the Enlightenment conception, or the medieval conception, were *monist conceptions* (Dewey, 1970, p. 107), that is, they dated the question of freedom from a preponderant factor that had causal force. For Dewey, it is



necessary, then, to expand this to a pluralistic analysis, showing that culture conditions the idea of individuality and thus modifies the human problem of thinking about freedom. In the end, he highlights an interesting conception that the world would have to be divided into an option for capitalism (freedom from liberalism, without equality) or an option for a socialist project (individual freedoms for equality and collective freedom).

In this antagonism, between the 1950s and the 1980s, some historical movements that were constituted in the conception of the emancipation of the working classes, commanded from the point of view of reform, of the revolution of some contexts of society, a transformation to another principle of freedom. They proposed this because of several projects, (e.g. Cuba).

What Dewey will show is that these new conceptions of freedom are the fact that, if we consider that cultural factors, then, condition the idea of individuality and modify the thought of freedom, and this would be the contribution of psychological theory, it would be necessary, ultimately, to conceive that the cultural bases of democracy condition the correlations between constitutive elements of a society, through the cooperative spirit (Dewey, 1970, p. 115), so that the development of each constituent element serves to liberate and mature the other. Dewey works with the idea that freedom acts and is culturally conditioned by the perspective of functioning as a cooperative spirit, otherwise it is not freedom.

It is different from a liberal conception that thinks of the idea of freedom only from the physical and material constraints, or from the preponderance of the economic. Hence the idea of a philosophical monism, which presupposes that my freedom ends where the freedom of the other begins. That individual freedoms would be the guarantors of a space that is totally autonomous from the principle of collective life. Dewey will state that it is not, freedom does not exist to create individuals. Freedom exists to ensure the integrity of individualities within a cooperative spirit, where each one is a constitutive element that serves to give freedom and mature to the other. There are individual reasons for seeking autonomy that are fundamental to thinking about freedom. But in collective life, these impulses have to be aggregated in the reason of this cooperative spirit in a way that gives freedom to one, but also helps to liberate the other, and in this context, both mature. This part is important when one starts to think about the public sphere (education, religion, politics), Thomas Jefferson's idea of public opinion and the case of autonomy that implies



at some point the exercise of freedom that helps to establish democratic institutions, called the public sphere by Habermas (maturing one's own *self*, according to Taylor).

Whether passing through the path of liberalism, or passing through the path of critical theory, and today through these so-called post-structuralist or post-modern conceptions, two things that are shown in the genesis of these conceptions, are not resolved because they are only founding tensions of the conception of freedom. The first is the question of the individual: What is the place of the individual in society? Adorno and Horkheimer will say that it is an extremely unresolved thing because the individual is a social invention. The other question is beyond the place of the individual, if it is possible to establish a universal principle of autonomy. Since cultural changes shape individualities or condition individualities in such a way that, if there is diversity of cultures, there can be no universality. If it is possible to think about freedom through the particularities of each culture, how far can we exchange, exchange experiences about the conception of freedom in a society that is increasingly culturally differentiated? There is no place in the world, according to Dewey, that freedom does not mean freeing oneself from oppression.

From Dewey's point of view, which differentiates it from Marcuse's point of view, which is the fact that what is established as freedom and principle does not matter so much, but the way in which it is realized. If it is in accordance with the values of a society, if it is corresponding to this liberation between the constituent elements, so that it configures a cooperative spirit. It is not positivity that guarantees, from the point of view of the idea of freedom, its effectiveness. But the way it is carried out, how individuals mature and organize themselves based on these conditionings of the values they place for democratic institutions. The cultural bases of democracy are as important to think about as the economic-scientific bases (physical and material development of society).

To understand the connection with Marcuse and see how this has repercussions from the point of view of human action, of social action, and how he can reflect on the conception of contemporary actors and see that these are always unresolved issues, or that they are not yet resolved. This idea of controlling emotional pulses that we have come to call interiors, which ultimately seek to control the imagination of individuals is important. This is the *link* to the issue with Marcuse. Thus, when you control these impulses, these motives, and the very imagination of individuals, you also control the material and physical basis of society.



3.2 FREEDOM IN MARCUSE

Marcuse will affirm that, from the point of view of the criticism he makes of the Welfare State, this State is not totalitarian, but it is totalizing. And that the totalizing character is precisely in the control of needs. To the extent that, in order to meet the needs of individuals, the State accumulates such a great diversity and particularity of information about individuals that it begins to control better. When you know all the needs of individuals and satisfy them, in a certain way, you know how the individual functions, and in doing so, you manage to control the production of needs itself in such a way that what is directed as the satisfaction of needs is nothing more or less than the creation of false needs that control the impulse and motives of the individual's own life and the way in which they associate and associate with each other. the reasons why they associate in collective life. By doing this, we stifle tensions, we stifle the very characteristic impulses of a model of social imagination that tends towards ruptures, that tends towards transformations, so it does not have the same logic with which, in the last instance, it emancipated the subjects because it made possible small "surpluses" in the basic deprivations of existence, a freedom is given to them that is false freedom.

And how does this issue happen? It will happen by internalization (in the psychoanalytic principle – idea of the control of desire). The control of the State will operate by internalizing the needs of these conceptions that unfold in the logic of freedom within capitalist society, especially thinking about the Social Welfare State.

If Dewey is going to affirm what totalitarian societies allow us to understand, it is that, if they control desires so that the imagination does not create a new society, what we have in the Welfare State is that the individual internalizes needs as a form of repression of impulses, closing the possibility of the individual having impulses for the new as he feels satisfied. The creation of the idea of satisfaction is to be in this relationship.

From Marcuse's point of view,

[...] "totalitarian" is not only a terrorist political coordination of society, but also a non-terrorist technical-economic coordination that operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests (MARCUSE, 1964, p. 24-25).

Marcuse also uses the more correct term, which is *introjection* (Marcuse, 1964, p. 13), which is more appropriate from the point of view of psychoanalysis. Opposing Dewey's interiorization.



In the text, Marcuse summarizes these new forms of control operated since the Welfare State at the end of the 1960s. The Welfare State understood that "fulfilling the needs", but carrying out through this control information about individuals and their own needs would be very important. That is, it is not realized from the desire of individuals, but from a certain distribution of resources stipulated in the reason of a government that plans needs. And when it does, the realization cancels the premises, that is, everything that was previously discussed in Dewey is canceled. And in a certain way, teleology, which is operated by the imagination about the new, about changes, about ruptures, the possibilities of the emergence of other realizations, are stifled by the principle of realization. An extremely effective form of control that occurs not by refusing access to fulfillment, but by achieving satisfaction.

In this context, the idea of non-conformism occurs, the impulse, the motives, which lead people to seek fulfillment are controlled to the extent that it is produced by *introjection*, needs that, from the point of view of a model of society, can and are satisfied institutionally.

Marcuse states that this model of control is placed as

[...] the most effective and resistant form of war against liberation is the implantation of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete forms of the struggle for existence (MARCUSE, 1964, p. 26).

So the intensity, satisfaction and even the character of human needs above the biological level have always been preconditioned, that is, they vary according to the social context, with the culture.

The fact that the possibility of doing or leaving aside, enjoying or destroying, possessing or rejecting something is or is not taken out of *necessity* depends on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary to common social interests and institutions (Marcuse, 1964, p. 26).

So when needs are created that are overexposed to the individual by particular social interests, they become false to the extent that they repress individuals and do not liberate, according to Marcuse. The idea that these needs operated in the forms of control are not controlled by the individuals themselves.

The logic with which Marcuse discusses this idea, in the case of Europe, was given by the destruction and the need to rebuild countries. In the United States, no. The United



States did not suffer the mass destruction. In the case of Europe, mass planning took place. Mass planning is not just about rent. Mass planning necessarily implies freeing subjects from some needs in order to instill others. So that these other needs become more important and, as time goes by, they become institutionalized, one can do as they did in neoliberalism, which is that basic need guaranteed to be mischaracterized (education is no longer a duty of the State, but enter into the logic of the market, of innovation,...).

Marcuse will state in relation to this, that

The judgment of needs and their satisfaction, under the given conditions, involves standards of *priority* —standards that refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources at man's disposal. The resources are calculable. (MARCUSE, 1964, p. 27).

On the one hand, there is a society under reconstruction, the idea of social planning that tries to ensure the satisfaction of needs, to provide the basic conditions for individuals to free themselves in search of their optimal development. However, having the protective security (Welfare State) that is ontological, the prospect of this optimal development is stifled to the extent that it minimizes the need to use the imagination to overcome conditions of deprivation. So a certain homogenization of access to resources is assumed as a way of stifling these drives for transformation and rupture, which are imaginary drives. What Castoriadis (1982) would call the "instituting imaginary" is stifled and the instituted imaginary of society is reinforced. As resources are calculable, these priority patterns lead us to another important logic to be recognized, which Marcuse will say is characteristic

[...] The distinctive feature of developed industrial society is the stifling of needs that demand liberation while maintaining and absolving the destructive power and repressive function of affluent society (MARCUSE, 1964, p. 28).

Some needs are satisfied to stifle others. What cannot be used is the creative way of getting out of deprivation, as an instituting logic of a political imaginary, for example, because there the contexts that Dewey will call the cooperative spirit are corrupted.

Another important point of Marcuse is that of the equalization of class distinctions and the ideological function of this equalization.



If the worker and his boss watch the same television program and visit the same picturesque spots, if the typist is as attractively painted as the boss's daughter, if the black man owns a Cadillac, if everyone reads the same newspaper, this assimilation does not indicate the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the establishment are shared by the underlying population (MARCUSE, 1964, p. 29).

That is to say, this idea of equalization of distinctions is excessively shared. Thus, the elements that are profound in the processes of distinction are not recognized. Since, it operates by introjection, it presupposes

[...] a variety of relatively spontaneous processes by which an "I" (Ego) transfers the "outside" to the "inside." Thus, introjection implies the existence of an inner dimension distinct from and even antagonistic to external demands—an individual consciousness and an individual unconscious *separate* from public opinion and behavior. The idea of "inner freedom" has its reality here: it designates the private space in which man can become and remain "himself" (MARCUSE, 1964, p. 30).

This is the idea of intimacy, which for Simmel (2005) is the asocial sphere of the individual. This perspective of when external needs overlap this intimate forum around thinking and valuing life, that intimacy in a certain way, is lost due to the way in which needs are satisfied.

To what extent does the individual's ability to think about himself constitute him as a subject and allow him to act, reflect and change? When needs and forms of control are created that act back on this individual disposition to think about oneself and one's needs, tensions of the imaginary are stifled and drives that would be proper to the action of change are stifled. For Marcuse, these forms of control are not only unconscious, but they are conscious. The dimension of surveillance that Marcuse indicates in the text, which will always be present and which is another dimension.

From the point of view of society, this is extrapolated through the demand that people make when they reach a certain degree of satisfaction of needs. Then one begins ideologically to share not only the form of satisfaction, but also judgments about the way in which satisfaction is adequate or not to needs. Thus, if that need is imposed from the outside and the individual shares this context, he is one of those who watch. So these forms of control participate precisely in the fact that to the extent that they satisfy or are intended to satisfy everyone, control over satisfaction is important to ensure that everyone has it.

Marcuse's basic idea is when society acquires control over the state, it acquires control of the satisfaction of its needs. And from there, it controls itself. Marcuse states that



the Welfare State, even though it arose from another conception that was not through the mass demands of Europeans to control the State, was due to the collapse, after World War II, but created a social planning that satisfies the needs produced in the cultural sphere within achievable cultural standards, and from this it generates a control mechanism operated by surveillance over people. This nullifies the *introjection* that guarantees, in a certain way, the maintenance of an autonomous spirit of the individual, as himself, capable of imagining and thinking about his projects and achievements.

Although they are distinct theoretical and political conceptions, these post-war records, the polarities placed in the post-war period, and the possibilities of realization around these polarities, ultimately made the thinkers of the time move around the same questions. They gave different answers according to their conceptions of policies and traditions, but they did not get out of this tendency to think about the technical-scientific bases (freedom) and the cultural bases. This integration of materialist or idealist theories in the development of history, and on the other hand of psychological or psychoanalytic conceptions of the relations of realization of the individual, of the drives and of the control of these drives.

Ultimately, the question that arises in Marcuse is that as every need is satisfied by the advent of the industrial society model, and this industrial society is based on the capacity for technical-scientific innovation, it is this principle of technical-scientific innovation that starts to dictate the new reasons for needs from the point of view of control models. And as a result, it starts to generate a pattern of thought that generates what Marcuse will call a one-dimensional behavior (Marcuse, 1964, p. 34). In which the ideas, aspirations and objectives that by their content transcend the established universe of word and deed, are repeated or reduced to terms of that universe. They operate by recursion. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and its quantitative extension. It is this logic that then begins to operate around the theme of progress that is at the basis of the ideological support of the Welfare State.

This logic is what allows the principle of satisfaction to be recognized as common to all and this is what operates the pattern of vigilance so that this satisfaction remains common among the subjects. In this context, associated with the model of progress, of technical-scientific development, which justifies the ideas of increasing modernization in this model of society, something is defined that is at the basis of the theory and practice of this model of control that Marcuse calls operationalism. And this "operationalism becomes,



in theory and practice, the theory and practice of *containment*" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 36). That is, the subjects are contained, the subjects are not explosive in the sense of the drives (eros). Realization as a form of control is based on an operationalism that is defined by containment, that is, it only fulfills its desire by containing the desire of the other.

If one takes this idea that for Marcuse operates as a technological rationality, since it is industrial, of innovation from the point of view of environmental resources, for example, it will operationalize within an existing rationality. When they think from the perspective of generation, they think about environmental goods from a perspective that technological rationality does not reach. The great difficulty when it is said, resources are finite, but technology is not. It is true that the resources will run out one day, but by then the technology will find a way. So the need to calculate resources is transferred to something else. If the subject has a closer relationship with nature, he will not think so. You won't think about shifting your responsibility to technology.

4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In summary, Marcuse, in the text on the paralysis of criticism: society without opposition (2015), points out that the mass media had a preponderant role in this process, since they stimulated the collective adhesion of individual projects. The enrichment of society and its growing rationalization, although they were not converted into concrete improvements extended to the entire population, were the banner that guaranteed the conformation of the masses and their consequent disarticulation. Technical progress would have been able to reconcile social structures with their opposing forces, both inebriated by the developmentalist perspective that was announced on the horizon of history. The scientific mastery of nature had inaugurated a new form of conquest of man himself, now subjected to the illusion of freedom that made him the servant of progressive ideology.

To question the way society was structured, even how to reverse the course of progress, was to question the very status of Western rationality, supported by the discourse of improving life linked to the technical-scientific project. It was necessary to understand the domination of man by man and other projects of power supported by scientific rationality as elements of the order of unreason. Industrial society was eminently irrational, to the extent that the imperative of productivity ended up reaping the freedoms and possibilities of human self-determination (Marcuse, 1964). In this sense, imagination was pointed out



as the only potentially transformative attitude, in a context in which the bankruptcy of traditional forms of political reaction was proclaimed.

This perspective has to do with what Dewey argued is only possible in a concept of cooperative spirit. To enable this dimension and extension of freedoms. Here, as this operationalism that is defined by containment, it is the surveillance assumed as a form of control that makes it possible that my need will only be fulfilled or satisfied if I control the satisfaction of the other. Since Marcuse is holding to the idea of progress, and since the idea of progress is related to scientific-technical innovation, the welfare state was containment in the sense of "contain and wait for progress." So that one gradually ascends to conceptions that can become infinite. The basic element for Marcuse is that this operates through an absurd incrementalism, which does not take into account the fact that resources are calculable. Because those who control know this and satisfy the needs within a certain standard. It operates on the principle of annulment of the drive so that the subject feels satisfied with what he has.

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