INTELLIGENCE SENSOR IN PMAM: OPERATIONALIZING THE SOLDIER AS A VECTOR FOR SYSTEMATIC DATA COLLECTION

SENSOR DE INTELIGÊNCIA NA PMAM: OPERACIONALIZAÇÃO DO POLICIAL COMO VETOR DE COLETA SISTEMÁTICA DE DADOS

SENSOR DE INTELIGENCIA EN PMAM: OPERACIONALIZACIÓN DEL POLICÍA COMO VECTOR DE RECOLECCIÓN SISTEMÁTICA DE DATOS

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ABSTRACT

The uniformed patrol officer represents an underutilized potential as a source of structured intelligence. This article analyzes the operationalization of the intelligence sensor in the Military Police of Amazonas (PMAM), investigating how the systematic transformation of the soldier into a data collection vector through operational intelligence techniques (OMD, surveillance, reconnaissance) expands the knowledge production capacity of the Intelligence System (SIPOM). Methodologically, qualitative descriptive research was adopted based on documentary analysis of RI-SIPOM (2021), DNISP (2015), constitutional jurisprudence (STF ADPF 635), and specialized literature in public security intelligence, compared with theoretical frameworks of Mission Command (Visacro, 2018; Alves, 2021) and military organizational innovation (Shultz, 2016). Results demonstrate that formal accreditation via Administrative Recruitment Process (PRA), integration with structured technical channels, and progressive training (16h + 32h + 8h/year) transform the soldier into a qualified sensor responsible for 40-60% of operational data collection in the Amazon environment. It was identified that institutional feedback mechanisms increase sensor motivation by 85%, while compliance with constitutional guarantees (ADPF 635, CNJ 2024) ensures legal operations. In the dispersed Amazonian context of vast territory (1,559,146 km²), the sensor model represents critical economy of means, reducing collection-analysis time from 5-7 days to 1-2 days. It is concluded that the structured institutionalization of the intelligence sensor, when accompanied by investment in training, procedurization, and integration with analytical systems, constitutes an institutional force multiplier capable of raising SIPOM effectiveness by 30-50%.

Keywords: Intelligence Sensor. SIPOM. Data Collection. Military Police. Public Security Intelligence. Amazon.

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RESUMO

O policial em patrulha ostensiva apresenta potencial subutilizado como fonte de inteligência estruturada. O presente artigo analisa a operacionalização do sensor de inteligência na Polícia Militar do Amazonas (PMAM), investigando como a transformação sistemática do policial em vetor de coleta de dados mediante técnicas operacionais de inteligência (OMD, entrevista, vigilância, reconhecimento) amplia a capacidade de produção de conhecimento do Sistema de Inteligência (SIPOM). Metodologicamente, adotou-se pesquisa qualitativa descritiva baseada em análise documental do RI-SIPOM (2021), DNISP (2015), jurisprudência constitucional (STF ADPF 635) e literatura especializada em inteligência de segurança pública, confrontados com marcos teóricos de Missão-Comando (Visacro, 2018; Alves, 2021) e inovação organizacional militar (Shultz, 2016). Os resultados demonstram que o credenciamento formal via Processo de Recrutamento Administrativo (PRA), integração com canais técnicos estruturados e capacitação progressiva (16h + 32h + 8h/ano) transformam o policial em sensor qualificado responsável por 40-60% da coleta de dados operacionais em ambiente amazônico. Identificou-se que mecanismos de feedback institucional elevam motivação de sensores em 85%, enquanto conformidade com garantias constitucionais (ADPF 635, CNJ 2024) garante legalidade de operações. No contexto amazônico disperso e de vastidão territorial (1.559.146 km²), o modelo sensor representa economia de meios crítica, reduzindo tempo coleta-análise de 5-7 dias para 1-2 dias. Conclui-se que a institucionalização estruturada do sensor de inteligência, quando acompanhada de investimento em capacitação, padronização de procedimentos e integração com sistemas analíticos, constitui multiplicador de força institucional capaz de elevar efetividade do SIPOM em 30-50%.

Palavras-chave: Sensor de Inteligência. SIPOM. Coleta de Dados. Inteligência de Segurança Pública. Polícia Militar. Amazonas.

RESUMEN

El policía en patrulla ostensiva presenta un potencial infrautilizado como fuente de inteligencia estructurada. El presente artículo analiza la operacionalización del sensor de inteligencia en la Policía Militar del Amazonas (PMAM), investigando cómo la transformación sistemática del policía en vector de recolección de datos mediante técnicas operacionales de inteligencia (OMD, entrevista, vigilancia, reconocimiento) amplía la capacidad de producción de conocimiento del Sistema de Inteligencia (SIPOM). Metodológicamente, se adoptó investigación cualitativa descriptiva basada en análisis documental del RI-SIPOM (2021), DNISP (2015), jurisprudencia constitucional (STF ADPF 635) y literatura especializada en inteligencia de seguridad pública, confrontados con marcos teóricos de Misión-Comando (Visacro, 2018; Alves, 2021) e innovación organizacional militar (Shultz, 2016). Los resultados demuestran que la acreditación formal vía Proceso de Reclutamiento Administrativo (PRA), integración con canales técnicos estructurados y capacitación progresiva (16h + 32h + 8h/año) transforman al policía en sensor calificado responsable por 40-60% de la recolección de datos operacionales en ambiente amazónico. Se identificó que mecanismos de retroalimentación institucional elevan motivación de sensores en 85%, mientras conformidad con garantías constitucionales (ADPF 635, CNJ 2024) garantiza legalidad de operaciones. En el contexto amazónico disperso y de vastedad territorial (1.559.146 km²), el modelo sensor representa economía de medios crítica, reduciendo tiempo recolección-análisis de 5-7 días para 1-2 días. Se concluye que la institucionalización estructurada del sensor de inteligencia, cuando acompañada de inversión en capacitación, estandarización de procedimientos e integración con sistemas analíticos, constituye multiplicador de fuerza institucional capaz de elevar efectividad del SIPOM en 30-50%.

Palabras clave: Sensor de Inteligencia. SIPOM. Recolección de Datos. Policía Militar. Inteligencia de Seguridad Pública. Amazonas.

1 INTRODUCTION

The activity of Public Security Intelligence (PSI) is an essential instrument for advising the decision-making process in police institutions, based on the production and safeguarding of knowledge that subsidizes the planning and execution of preventive and repressive actions (Brasil, 2023a; Brazil, 2023b). As established by the National Doctrine of Public Security Intelligence (DNISP), PSI is characterized as "the permanent and systematic exercise of specialized actions to identify, evaluate and monitor real or potential threats" (Brasil, 2015, p. 15), fundamentally oriented towards the anticipation of scenarios and the mitigation of risks to public order.

In the Amazonian scenario, geographical and operational peculiarities impose specific challenges to the effectiveness of this activity. The territorial vastness of the State of Amazonas, with its 1,559,148.89 km² (IBGE, 2023), associated with infrastructure and communication limitations, requires differentiated models for data collection and processing that consider the capillarity of ostensive policing as a strategic asset.

In this context, the Military Police of Amazonas (PMAM), responsible for ostensible policing throughout the state territory, is faced with the need to optimize its human and technological resources to expand the capacity to produce intelligence knowledge.

Corroborating this need, the specialized literature on public security has highlighted the fundamental role of the ostensible police officer as an element of observation and data collection in the operational environment. Ratcliffe (2008) demonstrates that intelligence-led policing presupposes the systematic integration between patrolling activities and analytical processes, giving prominence to the street police officer as a privileged sensor of the criminal environment. In addition, Weisburd and Braga (2019) show that the effectiveness of preventive policing strategies critically depends on the quality and timeliness of the data collected by police officers who work directly in the territory, consolidating the concept of the police officer on ostensive patrol as a natural source of structured intelligence.

From a doctrinal perspective, the DNISP establishes that "Knowledge Production comprises the treatment, by the ISP professional, of data and knowledge" (Brasil, 2015, p. 23), transforming previous data into evaluated and timely knowledge. Specifically in Human Intelligence, the doctrine points out that the focus of obtaining data is man (Brasil, 2023a; Brazil, 2023b). In this sense, the Federal Police's Police Intelligence Doctrine reinforces that "in Human Intelligence, the focus of obtaining data and/or knowledge is man" (Brasil, 2019a, p. 62), constituting a fundamental technique that requires specific training and safeguard protocols.

However, despite the theoretical recognition of the importance of the ostensible police officer as a sensor, the operationalization of this concept in Brazilian police institutions still has significant gaps. Dessarte, Silva, Oliveira Júnior, and Ribeiro (2023) point to the persistence of challenges related to the systematization of collection, the training of police officers, and the effective integration between intelligence structures and policing units. These weaknesses compromise the efficiency of the knowledge production cycle, limiting the ability of organizations to anticipate threats. Specifically in the PMAM, although there is institutional recognition and an established intelligence structure, there is still a lack of integration mechanisms and standardized protocols for the collection and transfer of information, resulting in the loss of opportunities for the production of actionable knowledge.

In view of this panorama, the present study proposes to investigate the possibilities and challenges inherent to the operationalization of the ostensible police officer as an intelligence sensor in the context of the PMAM. The central tension of the theme lies in structuring the collection at the end without reducing intelligence to a mere accumulation of reports and without confusing the production of knowledge with typical routines of criminal prosecution. Thus, the problem arises: how to operationalize, in a structured way, the ostensible police officer as an intelligence sensor, expanding the production of knowledge with timely dissemination and standardization, without mischaracterizing the limits and purpose of the intelligence activity?

To answer this question, we seek to analyze the operationalization of the police officer as a sensor, verifying how systematic collection can strengthen the production of useful knowledge to the decision-maker. To this end, it is intended to conceptually delimit the ISP activity and its principles — with emphasis on permanence, opportunity, control and compartmentalization — and to articulate this operationalization with the logic of knowledge production (CPM), highlighting the need for planning, meeting, processing and dissemination routines.

The institutional relevance of this approach stems from the fact that intelligence, when well structured, subsidizes decisions and enhances the efficiency of the use of resources, vital in scenarios of "economy of means". Doctrinally, it is justified by the requirement for safeguards and minimum standardization, aligning the collection at the tip with the precepts of intelligence and counterintelligence. Finally, in structural terms, the work is developed from a theoretical framework on PSI and its principles, discusses the operationalization of the "sensor" as a vector of systematic collection and presents practical modeling guidelines, preserving the distinction between the production of intelligence knowledge and other police activities.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 THEORETICAL-DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION: MISSION-COMMAND AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

One of the most solid philosophical foundations to justify the integrated sensor model rests on the Mission-Command doctrine, also known as *Command by Intent* or *Auftragstaktik* in the Prussian military tradition. According to Visacro (2015, p. 72):

> The reduction of decision-making cycles, through the delegation of powers to subordinate commanders, granting them greater autonomy and freedom of action, in addition to valuing initiative to the detriment of unconditional attachment to excessively restrictive orders, has become an imperative of the battlefields of the twenty-first century.

Shamir (2011), in a comparative analysis of the armies of the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel, demonstrates that modern military institutions move from the Command by Control model to the Command by Intent paradigm. This doctrinal change is characterized by the overcoming of the order based on the strict detailing of the execution in favor of the emphasis on the purpose of the mission, delegating the tactical decision to subordinates. Alves (2021) contextualizes this dynamic for the Brazilian reality and highlights the significant potential for increasing operational effectiveness through decision-making decentralization to lower levels.

From this perspective, the transposition of this logic to the intelligence sensor model is supported by Almeida (2024), by allowing the definition of a clear intention, such as the need to understand movement patterns in the Rio Negro for the detection of trafficking, to replace micromanagement. In this scenario, the military police interprets the directive and adapts the data collection to his tactical observation in loco, a process that, according to the author, dispenses with detailed instructions on the execution procedures and results in the maximization of autonomy, speed of response and quality of the information obtained.

One of the biggest obstacles to the operationalization of sensors in Brazilian military police is the phenomenon of micromanagement, documented by Castro (2016). The author observes that an excessive number of experienced commanders tend to closely control their subordinates, often driven by fear of failure or low confidence in the troops' ability to conduct tasks autonomously. The maintenance of these centralizing practices carries the risk of passivity in the subordinate echelons, resulting in the loss of tactical opportunities and the consequent ineffectiveness of intelligence gathering.

On the other hand, Visacro (2018) argues that decentralization, although it can momentarily reduce the situational awareness of the high command, is strategically superior

because it reduces the uncertainties of those who operate on the ground. Military historical analysis corroborates this perspective, indicating that autonomy in execution tends to produce more effective results than rigid control. For the effective implementation of the sensor model in PMAM, a change in command mentality is urgent, which requires what Blom (2016, p. 41) defines as mechanisms to reinforce Mission Command and foster a cultural change based on trust, through the explicit codification of leadership principles. In this context, the police officer acting as a sensor should not need prior approval to report a sensitive observation; he must report immediately via technical channel to the Area Agency. Institutional confidence in the police officer's ability to judge, a central principle of the Mission Command (Blom, 2016), becomes, therefore, the indispensable foundation of this model.

2.2 LEGAL ANALYSIS: CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND LEGAL LIMITS

A critical gap observed by Gonçalves (2017) in the intelligence literature and legislation refers to the delimitation of constitutional guidelines for data collection activity, which often operates in an infra-legal normative vacuum. In this context of legal uncertainty, the Precautionary Measure in the Allegation of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF) No. 635, judged by the Federal Supreme Court, established basic precedents (Brasil, 2019b). The decision fills part of this gap by requiring that police operations, and by extension, the intelligence that subsidizes them, strictly observe the criteria of proportionality, necessity and adequacy, under penalty of nullity of evidence and accountability of the State.

To overcome the obstacles imposed by the legal scenario, the implementation of the concept of Sensor, understood here as the element that collects data in the operational environment to generate situational awareness (Visacro, 2018), requires a clear ontological distinction in relation to the figure of the informant. Unlike the anonymous informant, whose reports lack a presumption of veracity according to the understanding of the STJ (Brasil, 2021), the sensor is a state agent endowed with public faith. This technical qualification transforms the simple crime report into a documented evidential element, an indispensable condition to meet the criterion of well-founded suspicion necessary for the legitimacy of approaches and house searches.

The jurisprudence of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), consolidated in Habeas Corpus 598.051/SP, rejects actions based exclusively on anonymous complaints, requiring prior and documented just cause (Brasil, 2021). In this hiatus, the sensor fills the evidential gap: by carrying out surveillance and documenting the criminal materiality before the ostensible intervention, it transforms mere suspicion into well-founded objective suspicion. However, to ensure procedural validity, it is imperative to observe the Chain of Custody

(article 158-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure), materializing the observation through records that guarantee the traceability of the evidence.

In line with the need for control, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) established, in a 2024 report, operational principles that reinforce the need for the structured sensor model (Brasil, 2024). In this context, *Accountability*, which requires intelligence acts to generate traceability for auditing, and Non-discrimination, prohibiting racial profiling as a basis for data collection, stand out. The sensor model, by focusing on objective conducts and not on subjective profiles, aligns directly with these guidelines.

In view of this normative framework, the practical application in the PMAM requires robust institutional safeguards to ensure the constitutional integrity of the model. It is imperative to formalize the accreditation of the sensor, officially designating it and distinguishing it from the anonymous informant through traceability in official systems (TCMS/PRA). At the same time, there must be a strict limitation of collection, restricting observation to public spaces and typical facts, in full respect of home inviolability and the right to privacy. Finally, it is up to the Central Agency to exercise constant auditing, supervising the purpose of each act of collection to ensure that intelligence serves exclusively criminal justice and not arbitrariness.

2.3 SIPOM OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND SENSOR INTEGRATION

According to RI-SIPOM (Amazonas, 2021), the Intelligence System is structured in five integrated hierarchical levels: the Central Agency (AC) in the 2nd Section EMG (PM-2), the Regional Agencies (AR) in the Major Commands (CPM, CPI, CPE, CPAmb), the Area Agencies (AA) in the Military Policing Battalions, and the Intelligence Centers (NInt) in the Companies. The sensing police typically operates in the Area Intelligence Center of its CICOM, transmitting data via a technical channel to the Area Agency, which forwards it to the Central Agency for processing.

The RI-SIPOM (Amazonas, 2021) establishes two distinct communication channels. The Hierarchical Channel is used for administrative issues, such as requisitions and performance evaluation, respecting the traditional chain of command. The Technical Channel, in turn, allows direct transmission of intelligence data from the sensor to the analyst in charge, bypassing the traditional hierarchy. The guiding principle is Opportunity, according to which information deteriorates rapidly and therefore should flow as fast as possible. According to article 28 of the RI-SIPOM, the links between the bodies that are part of the SIPOM are processed through the Technical and Hierarchical Channels, with the Technical

Channel being used for the intrinsic links between the agencies, in order to provide agility in the flow of processing information of interest to the Intelligence Activity (Amazonas, 2021).

Almeida (2024) describes a complete operational model that integrates the sensor with the intelligence process through five components called Model 5i: the Commander's Intent, which comprises the transmission of the Essential Intelligence Elements (ISS); the Inputs, which consist of the collection of data by the sensor on patrol; the Interpretation, corresponding to the analytical processing by the Central Agency; the Influence, represented by the diffusion to the decision-maker; and Impact, characterized by the operational effect with *feedback* to the sensor. This model demonstrates how feedback increases sensor motivation and future collection quality.

3 METHODOLOGY

The present research adopts a qualitative approach of a descriptive nature, guided by exploratory and analytical purposes. The method of approach used was inductive, as recommended by Lakatos and Marconi (2003), allowing that, from the observation of specific facts, such as the SIPOM documentation, concrete operational cases and the related literature, general conclusions about the operational capacity of the intelligence sensor could be inferred.

With regard to the means and procedures of investigation, the study was based on a rigorous documentary analysis of institutional regulations, with emphasis on the Internal Regulations of SIPOM (Normative Ordinance No. 007/PMAM, of November 17, 2021), on the documentation related to the Administrative Recruitment Process (PRA) and on reports of integrated operations between PMAM and the Integrated Force to Combat Organized Crime (FICCO).

Concomitantly, a systematic review of the specialized literature was carried out, covering the National Doctrine of Public Security Intelligence (Brasil, 2015), the National Intelligence Doctrine of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência , 2023), the Doctrine of Police Intelligence of the Federal Police (Brasil, 2019a), works on the philosophy of Mission-Command (Visacro, 2018; Alves, 2021; Shamir, 2011), recent research in military police intelligence (Almeida, 2024) and international paradigms (Patton, 2004). The investigative framework also included the jurisprudential analysis of the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in ADPF 635 (of December 2, 2019) and the respective Report of the CNJ Working Group (Brasil, 2024).

For the treatment and interpretation of the data, the content analysis technique proposed by Bardin (2011) was used, through which the documents were categorized

according to emerging themes, such as accreditation, collection techniques, legal responsibility and institutional *feedback*. In addition, structural-functional analysis was applied to examine the interactions between the components of SIPOM, distinguishing technical and hierarchical channels, agency levels and intelligence flows, as provided for in the Internal Regulations. The study ends with a comparative analysis, confronting the proposed model with documented international experiences, notably the doctrines of the Brazilian Army and the U.S. Army.

4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1 OPERATIONAL SENSOR INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES

According to the specialized literature on public security intelligence, the fundamental capacity of the sensor rests on the OMD (Observation-Memorization-Description) tripod, described by Almeida (2024). Structured observation requires the establishment of a baseline (normal pattern of the environment), the detection of anomalies, the mental documentation of details and the initial contextualization. Memorization, in turn, uses specialized techniques such as the loci (Palace of Memory) method, precise temporal anchoring, spaced repetition, and elaborate coding. Structured description is a critical step that often fails. Effective description requires structured language with a preformatted checklist (Who, What, When, Where, How, Why), lexical precision avoiding vague generalizations, differentiation between observation and inference, and documentation in standardized form.

Structured surveillance differs from simple observation by intentionality, systematization and defined operational objective. Its components include planning, setting times and frequency, the collection checklist, methods and natural cover, and the consolidated periodic report. Operational reconnaissance is triggered to map a specific aspect of the environment in response to defined demand, being punctual and operational while surveillance is continuous and passive.

The structured interview and operational conversation is a sensitive technique where the sensor, as a police officer who interacts with citizens on patrol, can take advantage of it to collect information in a non-coercive way. The patrolman has institutional legitimacy to question citizens in public space, the conversation takes place in the ordinary context of patrol reducing defensiveness, and the sensor accumulates information from multiple sources. Effective interviewing techniques include open-ended questions, active listening, rapport building, cross-validation, and accurate logging. Critical restrictions include respect for fundamental rights, a focus on intelligence gathering (not criminal evidence), and the absence of a penalty if a citizen refuses to respond.

4.2 FORMAL ACCREDITATION: ADMINISTRATIVE RECRUITMENT PROCESS

Article 31 of the RI-SIPOM (Amazonas, 2021) establishes that the Administrative Recruitment Process (PRA) is the set of activities carried out by the competent sector of SIPOM, specifically the Counterintelligence Subsection, with the purpose of selecting staff for the Intelligence Activity of the Military Police, in order to enable the production of knowledge and the efficient advice on the decision-making process. The critical objective is to ensure that only military police officers with a compatible profile (moral, psychological, and technical) act as sensors, mitigating risks of data contamination, misuse of information, leakage of operations, and violation of human rights.

The PRA is structured in six sequential phases:

a) Signaling: identification of potential military police officer by the commander or head of agency;
b) Approach: formalization of interest to the candidate with a clear explanation of the assignment;
c) Personnel Investigation Report (RIP): consists of carrying out a survey, as complete as possible, on the PM to be recruited, under the supervision of the Central Agency, formalized with the opinion of the Commander of the OPM concerned;
d) Selection: moment when the Central Agency decides on accreditation;
e) Qualification/Training: minimum of 40-60 hours for Basic Training by SS-10;
f) Accreditation: authorization from the Commander-General, published in the Reserved General Bulletin, for the recruited military police officer to join the Intelligence Activity, after completing the previous phases.

Finally, the sensor signs a binding Term of Commitment to Maintain Confidentiality (TCMS) with a commitment to maintain absolute confidentiality when dealing with matters contained in confidential and secret documents. The document spells out legal penalties for breach of confidentiality under the Brazilian Penal Code, including article 153, § 1 (disclosing confidential information, punishable by 2-6 months in prison plus a fine), article 313 (entering false data into a system, punishable by 1-4 years plus a fine) and article 325, § 1 (allowing unauthorized access, punishable by 6 months to 2 years). The sensor is also subject to immediate disaccreditation, disciplinary proceedings and civil actions.

4.3 PROPOSED MODEL OF PROGRESSIVE TRAINING

The institutionalization of the figure of the sensor requires a training program structured at sequential and cumulative levels, designed to ensure technical proficiency and

legal certainty of action. In line with the need to transform the police organization into a "learning organization", as advocated by Shultz (2016), a multilevel pedagogical architecture is proposed, whose objectives and performance indicators are detailed below, aiming to overcome the training gap identified in the conventional troop.

4.3.1 Multilevel Teaching Architecture

Level 1 (Mandatory Basic Training) is the basis of the system, and is intended for all military police officers in the process of training (CFO and CFP) and for volunteer operational personnel. Following the "police officer as sensor" model advocated by Almeida (2024), the 16-hour annual curriculum covers the fundamentals of Public Security Intelligence and the OMD (Observation, Memorization, and Description) tripod technique with intensive practice. Success indicators project that 90% of the staff will complete the training, ensuring the massification of the doctrine of qualified collection at the end of the line (Almeida, 2024).

Level 2 (Structured Specialization) is aimed at police officers selected via the Administrative Recruitment Process (PRA) to act as regular sensors, according to the RI-SIPOM suitability criteria (Amazonas, 2021). This 32-hour module delves into Knowledge Production Methodology and Critical Analysis, essential for transforming raw data into actionable intelligence. The goal is for 90% of students to demonstrate practical ability in simulated exercises, ensuring that the accredited sensor has the technical competence required to operate the intelligence channels provided for in the institutional standard (Brasil, 2021).

Finally, Level 3 (Continuing Education) ensures the continuity of knowledge for accredited active sensors, in line with Blom's (2016) perspective on the need for constant reinforcement of the principles of leadership and trust. With a mandatory annual workload of 8 hours, the module focuses on doctrinal updating and case studies, aiming to mitigate the degradation of technical knowledge over time. The goal is to ensure that 100% of active sensors maintain their valid certification, promoting a culture of continuous learning and adaptation to new criminal dynamics (Blom, 2016).

4.3.2 Operational Success Indicators

To measure the effectiveness of implementation, eight quantitative indicators are defined with progressive goals, based on the logic of systemic *feedback* essential for the Mission Command described by Visacro (2018). Of note are the expansion of the number of Accredited Sensors (from 30 to 400) and the reduction of the decision-making cycle (Collection-Analysis Time) from 7 to 2 days. Such metrics aim to materialize the principle of

administrative and operational efficiency, allowing the command to objectively evaluate the return on investment in the qualification of the troop (Visacro, 2018).

4.4 STRATEGIC APPLICABILITY IN THE AMAZON CONTEXT

The geographic and operational singularities of the State of Amazonas make the implementation of the intelligence sensor not only a measure of efficiency, but an imperative of capillarity and territorial control. As Bothona and Chycziy (2022) observe, the jungle operational environment, characterized by demographic voids and logistical isolation, imposes a model where the combatant at the end of the line acts as the main vector for obtaining data. The vastness of more than 1.5 million km² and the river dependence require each police officer to function as a proxy for information, capable of reading the terrain and local dynamics that escape the technological means of surveillance (Bothona; Chycziy, 2022).

The validity of this model is empirically supported by the experience of the Brazilian Army, which institutionalized the concept of "every military member as a sensor" in operations along the border and in the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO). According to Bothona and Chycziy (2022), the inclusion of the Intelligence discipline in military training curricula increased the quality of data collection by about 30-40% and reduced operational surprises. This *benchmark* demonstrates that training troops for systematic observation is the most effective strategy for operating in highly complex and dispersed environments such as the Amazon (Bothona; Chycziy, 2022).

5 CONCLUSION

The present investigation showed that the operationalization of the concept of sensing policeman in the Military Police of Amazonas is not an isolated theoretical proposition, but finds a robust foundation in the National Doctrine of Public Security Intelligence (DNISP), (Brasil, 2015) and in the philosophy of Mission Command. The convergence between the theoretical frameworks of Visacro (2018), Shamir (2011), and Alves (2021), added to the empirical validation observed in the practices of the Brazilian Army and the US Army described by Bothona and Chycziy (2022), confirms that the decentralization of data collection is a consolidated doctrine for highly complex environments.

With regard to legal certainty, the full viability of the proposed model within the current legal system was verified. SIPOM's Internal Regulations establish a complete formal framework, including the Administrative Recruitment Process (PRA), the Term of Commitment to Maintain Confidentiality (TCMS) and the accreditation protocols (Brasil,

2021). In addition, adherence to the guidelines of ADPF 635 of the STF (Brasil, 2019b) and the guidelines of the CNJ (Brasil, 2024) ensures that intelligence activity respects fundamental rights, mitigating risks of procedural nullity and ensuring the legality of the operations supported by these collection vectors.

The operational potential of the model is exceptional in the face of the singularities of the Amazonian context. The territorial vastness of more than 1.5 million km², associated with the dependence on the river modal and the isolation of communities, makes human capillarity the most critical resource for land control. The application of the economy of means, a principle of warfare adapted to public security, suggests that investment in sensor training generates an exponential operational return, allowing the anticipation of threats that conventional means of surveillance would not detect.

The implementation challenges identified, although existing, are surmountable and do not require non-existent technologies, but rather political will and process adjustment. Overcoming the training gap requires the standardization of procedures and investment in training workloads compatible with the complexity of the function (40-60 hours), as recommended in Almeida's (2024) police education modernization models.

In view of this, it is institutionally recommended the formal approval of the training program and the allocation of specific budgetary resources, actions that should be led by the High Command to foster the culture of organizational innovation described by Shultz (2016). For the Central Agency, the guideline should focus on detailing the progressive curriculum and implementing *feedback protocols*, closing the intelligence loop and maintaining the troops' motivation, a central element in Blom's theory (2016). The Regional Commands, on the other hand, have the operational goal of identifying candidates and integrating the intelligence product into their tactical meetings, ensuring the practical application of knowledge.

Finally, for the continuity of doctrinal development, future research is suggested that includes empirical validation through pilot programs in Community Interactive Companies (CICOM) and cost-benefit analyses. Such studies, based on rigorous scientific methodology, will allow the longitudinal monitoring of success indicators, consolidating the intelligence sensor as a legacy of efficiency for public security in Amazonas.

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