THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF POLICE ACTIVITY BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE: STATE LETHALITY AND INSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES IN BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

Abstract

This article examines the external oversight of police activity as a constitutional function assigned to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, analyzing its normative foundations, structural limits, and the recurring problem of effectiveness in the Brazilian context. It starts from the understanding that effectiveness is not to be confused with mere procedural compliance, but rather with the institutional capacity to produce verifiable results, prevent violations of fundamental rights, and break structural patterns of state violence. The study identifies central bottlenecks in the traditional model, such as informational dependence on police corporations, the fragmentation of diffuse oversight, structural insufficiency, and the bureaucratization of institutional practices, all of which contribute to the reproduction of impunity and penal selectivity. In light of the Inter-American Human Rights System, with particular emphasis on the case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil, and of the case law of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court in ADPF 635/RJ, the article argues that external oversight is an indispensable institutional guarantee for reducing police lethality, protecting the right to life, and strengthening the democratic legitimacy of justice institutions.