LEGAL CERTAINTY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND THE PROHIBITION OF SOCIAL BACKSLIDING

Authors

  • Joaquim Ribeiro de Souza Junior

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.56238/sevened2026.013-008

Keywords:

Legal Certainty, Fundamental Rights, Prohibition of Social Backsliding, Human Dignity, Democratic Rule of Law

Abstract

This article examines legal certainty as a structural element of the Democratic Rule of Law and analyzes its relationship with the prohibition of social backsliding under the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. It is based on the premise that legal certainty is not limited to the formal stability of legal rules, but also includes the protection of legitimate expectations, the preservation of consolidated legal situations, and the safeguarding of levels of implementation already achieved by fundamental rights, especially social rights. The study investigates the constitutional foundations of legal certainty, its connection with human dignity, and its role in restraining state measures that arbitrarily or disproportionately weaken social gains already secured. It argues that the prohibition of social backsliding, although it does not impose absolute immutability on the legislature, operates as a standard for reviewing state choices, requiring adequate constitutional justification for restrictive changes in the social sphere. The article concludes that, in a constitutional order committed to the effectiveness of fundamental rights, legal certainty and the prohibition of backsliding work in a complementary manner, serving as instruments for the protection of trust, normative stability, and human dignity.

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Published

2026-03-17

How to Cite

de Souza Junior, J. R. (2026). LEGAL CERTAINTY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND THE PROHIBITION OF SOCIAL BACKSLIDING. Seven Editora, 130-138. https://doi.org/10.56238/sevened2026.013-008