BETWEEN LAW AND FEAR: HOW THE TCU NEUTRALIZES THE LINDB AND THE NLLC

Abstract

The article investigates why the LINDB (Law 13,655/2018) and the NLLC (Law 14,133/2021) have yielded limited practical effects in public management, with emphasis on the external control exercised by Brazil’s Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) and on repercussions for administrative decision-making, especially in municipal contracting and urban policies. It adopts a critical documentary review (2018–2025) of TCU rulings and regulations, Supreme Federal Court decisions, opinions from the Office of the Attorney General, and academic literature, selected through explicit criteria. Findings indicate incipient use of a precedent technique, normative and applicative variations concerning limitation periods, irregular application of LINDB art. 28, underuse of consensual instruments, and centralizing effects that compress subnational decision margins. The article argues that low predictability and weak consideration of context intensify decision retrenchment (“pen paralysis”). It proposes guidelines for stating theses and distinctions, parameters for gross error, risk assessment, and the adoption of commitments with monitoring and publicity. The implications point to gains in legal certainty and governance of urban contracting, while preserving liability for intent or gross error.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.56238/sevened2025.036-034